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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
its inclusion under the interpretation of Typographers Local 38 v.
NLRB.57 Management negotiators will be able to condition agreement
to the benign clause only upon receipt of a valuable concession by the
union.
JOHN 0. POLLARD
Securities Regulation-The Reincarnation of the Deception Requirement
Rule lOb-5 1 has been used to develop a corpus of federal law relat-
ing to fiduciary obligations of directors, officers, and majority share-
holders2 in an area that has traditionally been a subject for state rather
than federal regulation.3 Due to its broad language, the rule creates an
almost undefined liability. Absent definitive legislative action, courts
have assumed primary responsibility for defining the extent of liability.
In the recent case of Popkin v. Bishop,' the Second Circuit clearly
rejected imposition of rule 1Ob-5 liability in the absence of an allegation
of nondisclosure or deception in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. This holding, reiterating nondisclosure as a fundamental
element in such an action, represents a significant restriction on the
expansion of rule lOb-5 into the area of corporate fiduciary obligations.
5 See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra. Attention should be called to the fact that
Typographers Local 38 was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. However, an opposite
decision in the near future seems unlikely.
117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971):
It shall be unlawful...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to [make a misleading
omission]. . . or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
'See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Entel
v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'Some commentators have expressed concern about this intrusion. Compare Fleischer,
"Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965), with Lohf, The
Corporation Law of the Securities Acts: Federal Rights of Corporations, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 76
(1963).
For a discussion of the fiduciary responsibilities of corporate management, see H. HENN,
CORPORATIONS §§ 235-41 (2d ed. 1970).
'464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
DECEPTION REQUIREMENT
Popkin, a shareholder of Bell Intercontinental Corporation,
brought a derivative action5 to enjoin the proposed corporate merger of
Bell and its two subsidiaries into the Equity Corporation, the majority
shareholder of Bell.6 Injunctive relief was sought on the ground that the
exchange ratios in the proposed merger agreement were unfair to the
minority shareholders of Bell and its subsidiaries as well as to the com-
panies themselves. Popkin alleged that by proposing those exchange
ratios, Equity and various officers and directors of Bell breached a
variety of fiduciary duties and that such breaches entitled him to relief
despite a complete disclosure of the merger terms. In affirming dis-
missal of the complaint, the Second Circuit held that in view of the
adequate disclosure, which is the principal federal interest served by rule
lOb-5, 7 the appropriate remedy of minority shareholders to test the
fairness of the merger terms is a suit for injunction in the state courts.8
Furthermore, the court reiterated that "non-disclosure [is] a key issue
in rule lOb-5 cases" and noted that plaintiff's "complaint contains no
allegation or hint of any misrepresentation . . . or of a failure . . . to
disclose any material fact in connection with the merger proposal."' The
basic problem thus presented in the case was whether rule lOb-5 is
violated when a breach of fiduciary duty is at issue in the sale or pur-
chase of stock 10 even though there has been full and fair disclosure of
the terms of the proposed merger.
'Although neither § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 nor the implementing rule
lOb-5 provides explicitly for a private remedy, such a right was implied early in the history of the
section. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court
recently noted that "[i]t is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b)."
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
ABell owned 66% of the common stock of one of its subsidiaries and 81% of the other. Equity
Corporation controlled Bell and through Bell the two subsidiaries. 464 F.2d at 716.
'Id. at 720. The Supreme Court recently remarked that "the 1934 Act and its companion
legislative enactments embrace a 'fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclo-
sure for the philosophy of caveat emptor .... Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (footnote omitted).
8The court noted that the merger terms had been included in a judicially approved settlement
to other litigation and as a result a question of estoppel exists. However, serious doubt was
expressed that estoppel applies under the circumstances presented. 464 F.2d at 720-21.
1Id. at 718-19. Indeed, plaintiff conceded that a full and fair disclosure had been made. Id. at
718.
"OThe SEC originally took the position that an exchange of stock as a result of a merger did
not constitute a "sale." Since 1951, however, this position has been reversed. Mader v. Armel, 402
F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1968). Under the theory of Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262
(7th Cir. 1967), a merger involving an exchange of stock is a "sale", thus allowing a lOb-5 action
either by the corporation or by its shareholders in a derivative capacity.
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A logical starting point in analyzing the relevance of rule lOb-5 to
an alleged breach of fiduciary obligation is the landmark decision of
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp." In that case the president and con-
trolling stockholder of Newport passed up a merger which would have
been beneficial to the minority stockholders and instead sold his stock
at a premium to another company. Plaintiffs' theory of injury was that
this sale of control stock at a premium, together with certain misrepre-
sentations made to them to facilitate the sale, constituted fraudulent
practices in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. The
court, in denying relief to the plaintiffs2 concluded:
(1) that Section 10(b) was directed solely at that type of misrepresen-
tation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the purchase or
sale of securities,
(2) that it extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or
seller, and
(3) that it was not intended to provide a remedy for fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs. 3
While both the "usually associated with"" and the purchaser-seller"'
requirements enunciated in Birnbaum are significant isues in the area
of securities regulation, the third aspect of the opinion will be the focus
of this discussion.1
6
Although it is apparent that the Birnbaum court excluded fraudu-
lent mismanagement of corporate affairs from the scope of rule lOb-5,
it is by no means certain that other courts would likewise construe the
section. In McClure v. Borne Chemical Co.7 the Third Circuit observed
by way of dictum that rule lOb-5 "imposes broad fiduciary duties on
1193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
"rhe Birnbaum defendants were subsequently held liable to the shareholders under state law
in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
11193 F.2d at 464.
"A significant erosion occurred in the case of A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1967). In that case the court held that rule lOb-5 prohibits all fraudulent schemes in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities whether involving a unique form of deception or a "garden
variety" type. Id. at 397.
"For discussion of the standing problem, see generally Lowenfels, The Demise of The Birn-
baum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Ruder, Current Develop.
ments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule J0b.5,
26 Bus. LAWYER 1289 (1971).
"See generally Lowenfels, Rule lob-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action, 18 VAND. L.
REv. 893 (1965).
1292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 51
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management vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders." 18
Subsequently, other courts have emphasized that the fact that a securi-
ties transaction was part of a broader scheme involving corporate mis-
management does not bar a rule lOb-5 action. As stated by the court in
Pettit v. American Stock Exchange,19 the mere fact "that the fraud was
perpetrated by insiders does not render Section 10(b) inapplicable, if the
transaction represents an abuse of the securities trading process, and
should be properly subject to SEC regulation for an adequate rem-
edy."2 A contrary interpretation would import its own demise:
"[C]orporate officers and directors would possess an immunity from the
consequences of their fraud under. . . Rule lOb-5 which outsiders who
may have collaborated with them in defrauding the corporation would
not possess .... ,,21 Such an expansive reading of rule lOb-5 as enunci-
ated by the Pettit court encouraged further development in the applica-
tion of rule lOb-5 to management misconduct.
In 1964 the Second Circuit had before it the similar cases of Ruckle
v. Roto American Corp.22 and O'Neill v. Maytag2 but reached differ-
ent results. In Ruckle plaintiff's derivative claim alleged that the major-
ity directors, in authorizing issuance of shares to insiders at an inade-
quate price, withheld from the minority directors the latest financial
information relating to a proposed stock issue. In upholding plaintiffs
claim, the Second Circuit held that the majority directors' failure to
disclose material information to the minority directors constituted de-
ception upon the corporation. 24 In dictum Ruckle went further and
suggested that even full disclosure to all the directors does not necessar-
ily preclude rule lOb-5 liability. 25
In O'Neill the same court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
by the lower court. After observing that there was "[n]o serious claim
of deceit, withheld information or misstatement of material fact in this
"Id. at 834.
"1217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (stock issued for inadequate consideration and subsequently
distributed publicly).
2Id. at 25.
2"New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (corporate
officers acquired stock interests in properties in which their corporations were interested and
caused the corporation to purchase and sell its own and other stock at unfair prices).
22339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
"339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
21339 F.2d at 27.
2Id. at 29.
19731
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
case,"2 the court held that "where the duty allegedly breached is only
the general duty existing among corporate officers, directors, and share-
holders, no cause of action is stated under rule lOb-5 unless there is an
allegation of facts amounting to deception. 27 In O'Neill plaintiff had
charged that the directors set an exchange ratio that was detrimental
to the minority for the purpose of retaining control. It was alleged that
all board members were participants. Although seemingly falling within
the dictum of Ruckle, the O'Neill court distinguished Ruckle as involv-
ing "a clear allegation of deception"2 whereas no such allegation ex-
isted in O'Neill.9 The Ruckle dictum was later followed, however, by
the Third Circuit in a rule lOb-5 derivative suit in which the directors
were unanimous in defrauding the corporation." By viewing the minor-
ity shareholders as the defrauded corporate entity, the Third Circuit had
no difficulty in finding "deception."'"
In 1968 the "deception" requirement was further analzyed by the
Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook12 Plaintiff sued deriva-
tively, alleging that his corporation (Banff Oil, Ltd.) issued securities to
Aquitaine, a controlling corporation, and to an outsider at prices that,
because of undisclosed material information, did not represent the true
value of the shares. This issuance was allegedly part of a conspiracy to
defraud the remaining Banff stockholders. On these facts the Second
Circuit dismissed the complaint as to the outsider, but held that the
issuance of securities to Aquitaine presented a triable issue under rule
2339 F.2d at 767.
11Id. at 767-68.
"I1d. at 768.
2'One judge offered this explanation:
The only possible material difference I can perceive between Ruckle and O'Neill is
that in Ruckle there were directors who were not participants in the transaction and thus
could be deceived in the ordinary sense. In either case, however, the failure of the
defendant directors to perform their duty presumably injured the corporation, and I do
not believe it is sound to differentiate between situations where the directors were unani-
mous in wrongdoing and those where less than all were involved.
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 270 (7th Cir.) (Fairchild, J., concurring), cert. deied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
0Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (defendant insiders sold shares to themselves
at an unfair price).
"Id. at 869.
32405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). For a detailed
analysis, see Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corpora-
tion Law, 55 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1969).
[Vol. 51
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lOb-5.3 3 The allegedly improper exercise of a "controlling influence"
by Aquitaine over the Banff board of directors was itself within the
proscription of rule lOb-5:
If it is established that the transaction took place as alleged it consti-
tuted a violation of Rule lOb-5, subdivision (3) because Aquitaine
engaged in an "act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." Moreover, Aquitaine and the
directors of Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders of Banff
(other than Aquitaine).
34
If indeed Schoenbaum stands for the proposition that a violation of rule
lOb-5 is established upon the showing of an improper exercise of con-
trol, as suggested by at least one commentator, 3 then by eliminating
the traditional "fraud" or "deception" requirement, the Schoenbaum
decision gives impetus to the further broadening of federal law relating
to fiduciary duties of directors, officers, and majority shareholders.
3 1
Thus the stage was set for clarification of the role of deception in
rule lOb-5 cases involving breaches of fiduciary duties. The Second
Circuit responded with the decision in Popkin v. Bishop.3 7 After observ-
ing that it had focused on improper self-dealing in Schoenbaum, the
Second Circuit nonetheless concluded that such emphasis "did not elim-
inate nondisclosure as a key issue in Rule lOb-5 cases. 138 The justifica-
tion for the emphasis was that since state law does not demand prior
shareholder approval in most situations involving self-dealing in securi-
ties transactions, full and fair disclsoure will rarely occur. Thus, "it
makes sense to concentrate on the impropriety of the conduct itself
rather than on the 'failure to disclose' . . . ."I However, where merger
transactions are involved that require shareholder approval under state
law, the principal design of rule lOb-5 (imposing a duty of disclosure)
has special relevance. Indeed, it is apparent that this renewed emphasis
3'The critical difference appeared to be that Aquitaine could exercise controlling influence
over the board of directors.
11405 F.2d at 219-20.
3'Ruder, "Challenging Corporate Action Under Rule lOb-5", 25 Bus. LAWYER 75, 86 (1969).
"Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit held that deception is not a necessary element of a lob-5
claim. Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970),
"1464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
1Id. at 719. The decision is careful to point out that the court in Schoenbaum "suggested"
that self-dealing itself constituted a rule lOb-5 violation.
39Id.
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on disclosure only applies in those rare situations of self-dealing where
the law mandates prior shareholder approval. This, plus full and fair
disclosure (or concession thereof by plaintiff) will arise infrequently due
to the nature of corporate self-dealing. Accordingly, the court reasoned
that since Popkin "admitted that defendants fully and fairly disclosed
all material facts surrounding the merger to all interested parties, in-
cluding the minority shareholders,"40 the federal interest under rule lOb-
5 had been satisfied.4 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that where
the minority shareholders are powerless to prevent the merger, addi-
tional protection should be afforded them. The court noted that such
disclosed information placed them in a position to sue under state law
to enjoin the merger as unfair.4 Even should such action fail, the dis-
closed information would enable shareholders intelligently to exercise
their appraisal rights. One should note, however, that although ap-
praisal rights mitigate against the unfairness of such a merger by per-
mitting a minority shareholder to sell his shares for cash at a fair price,
an unfair merger forecloses a choice of retention of ownership in the
surviving corporation.
If the Popkin situation were held to be within the ambit of rule I Ob-
5 without the "disclosure" requirement, federal courts would in effect
be called upon to regulate many areas of internal management tradi-
tionally in the state realm. Such an intrusion would present the danger
of disruption of state policies on corporate management as well as a
possible conflict in standards of conduct. This factor becomes especially
acute when, as presently, state court decisions are redefining the fidu-
ciary duties of corporate directors and officers 43 and the responsibility
of majority shareholders to the minority shareholders. 4  Seen in this
'°Id. at 720.
"Injury to the corporation as a result of nondisclosure takes several forms: (1) it may permit
the defendants to position themselves so as to commit further mismanagement, Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 637 (2d Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); (2) it
may encourage mismanagement, Globus, Inc. t. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
(3) it may preclude others from seeking derivative relief, Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp.
766, 766 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dictum).
412464 F.2d at 720. Equity Corporation's ability, as majority shareholder, to accomplish the
merger with or without any other shareholder's approval could not by itself defeat a 10b-5 claim,
See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
One writer has suggested that many lOb-5 merger cases pose essentially a question of fairness.
Ruder, supra note 35, at 77-78.
"2See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno,.24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).




perspective, Popkin's reincarnation of the "disclosure" limitation in rule
lOb-5 actions involving alleged breaches of fiduciary obligations seems
a salutary conclusion. On the other hand, a merger often involves self-
dealing and, because of the complexity of the transaction, "enhances the
opportunities for fraud and thus increases the need for antifraud protec-
tion."45
In view of the special provisions under rule lOb-5 for venue, " choice
of forum,47 and nationwide service of process" and the opportunity it
provides for escape from the state security-for-costs statutes in deriva-
tive suits49 and a more restrictive state substantive law,"0 it is apparent
why the scope of rule lOb-5 has been continuously tested in private
actions. But before expansion beyond the current precariously defined
limits, comprehensive congressional policy seems preferable to the pres-
ent ad hoc decisional approach supported by administrative rules."
WILLIAM L. HAIGH
"Argument of Commissioner's Counsel quoted in Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262,
267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). Due to inability to agree upon a position, the
SEC declined to file an amicus brief in Popkin. 464 F.2d at 719 n.15.
4815 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
"See Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745, 747-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
s15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
"See McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961).
"See generally Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-IOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for De-
frauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123-33 (1950).
"For discussion of a current attempt at codification of rule lOb-5, see generally Loss, The
American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAWYER 27 (1969).
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